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Abstract—In this paper, we present a novel Secured Out-
sourced Content Based Image Retrieval solution, which allows
looking for similar images stored into the cloud in a homomor-
phically encrypted form. Its originality is fourfold. In a first
time, it extracts from a Paillier encrypted image a wavelet based
global image signature. In second, this signature is extracted in
an encrypted form and gives no clues about the image content.
In a third time, its calculation does not require the cloud to
communicate with a trusted third party as usually proposed by
other existing schemes. More clearly, all computations required
in order to look for similar images are conducted by the cloud
only with no extra-communications. To make possible such a
computation, we propose a new fast way to compare encrypted
data, these ones being encrypted by the same public key or not,
and using a recursive relationship in-between Paillier random
values when computing the different resolution levels of the
image wavelet transform. Experiments conducted in two distinct
frameworks: medical image retrieval with as purpose diagnosis
aid support, and face recognition for user authentication; indicate
that the proposed SOCBIR does not change image retrieval
performance.
Index Terms—Homomorphic encryption, secure content based
image retrieval, processing of encrypted data, cloud computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has emerged as a successful paradigm
allowing individuals and companies to flexibly store and
process large amounts of data without a need to purchase
and maintain their own networks and computer systems. In
healthcare for example, different initiatives aim at sharing
medical images and Personal Health Records (PHR) in be-
tween health professionals or hospitals with the help of the
cloud [1][2][3]. In order, to take advantage of such volume
of data and of the medical knowledge it represents, several
Content Based Image Retrieval (CBIR) methods have been
introduced to support decision making [4]. In a general way,
the basic concept of a CBIR system stands in the retrieval of
images into a database that are similar to a request image. In
medical imaging, knowing the diagnosis associated to these
similar images can give clues to the physician before he
accesses or analyses the image. Another application that can
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take advantage of CBIR corresponds to user authentication
based on face recognition, where a user is identified through
the comparison of his biometric data with those stored and
managed in a database into the cloud by a third party [5]. If
there is a match, the user can log into his account or obtain
the service provided by the third party.
Beyond their innovative character, such cloud applications
must take into account data security issues that are increased
especially in terms of confidentiality and privacy. Indeed, data
outsourcing involves at the same time that users loss the
control on their own data [6]. Recent news show clear evidence
that outsourced storage is not safe against privacy threats, these
ones being external (e.g., hackers [7]) or internal [5][8]. There
is thus an interest to develop Secured Outsourced Content
Based Image Retrieval (SOCBIR) methods.
Different approaches have been proposed to secure CBIR
methods. They can be differentiated depending on if they work
on local or global image signature, and on the way they make
interacting encryption with image signature computation and
comparison. Regarding the way signatures are handled, one
first solution consists in outsourcing an image along with its
signature calculated a priori [9]. In this scenario, the server (or
equivalently the cloud) only conducts signatures’ comparison.
Images are encrypted with algorithms such as AES or 3-
DES and cannot be manipulated unless they are decrypted.
The CBIR process is thus shared between the client and the
server. An alternative to this approach proposes to extract
signatures or features directly from encrypted images. To do
so, most solutions make use of homomorphic encryption the
interest of which is that it allows performing operations (e.g.
” + ”, ”× ”) onto encrypted data with the guarantee that the
decrypted result equals the one carried out onto unencrypted
data. To the best of our knowledge, Erkin et al. [10] proposed
the first privacy-preserving biometric face recognition scheme
securing the Eigenfaces recognition algorithm. However, this
scheme only ensures the confidentiality of the query image
due to the fact the server compares the signature extracted
from the encrypted image it received to the ones of images
stored in its database under an un-encrypted form. In [11],
SIFT features are extracted from an image encrypted with
the Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem. This method needs
1-round of communication between the server and the user
for features’ extraction and much more to compare image
signatures. This scheme has also been proved unfeasible in
terms of computational complexity with some security weak-
nesses [12]. The authors of [12] improve this scheme with the
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2help of fully homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty
computation but with as consequence a great increase of
the storage, computation and communication complexities.
Another improvement suggested in [13], stands on the use
of order-preserving encryption (OPE [14]) and three non-
colluding clouds. It should be noticed that both solutions given
in [12] and [13] do not well preserve the performance of the
original SIFT features. To overcome this issue, [15] and [16]
propose a secure SIFT feature set based on two independent
cloud servers. If the complexity of communication with the
user is reduced, it assumes that the two servers do not collude.
In [17], the interest is given to SURF features, another kind
of local image features, and to their extraction from homo-
morphically encrypted images. As the previous schemes, this
solution requires highly interactive communications between
the server and the user in order to extract the image signature
by executing certain basic operations in the encrypted domain
the server cannot conduct alone without accessing to the
data in clear (e.g., division, square root). [18] proposed to
reduce the communication complexity of [17] with the help
of somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) and two non-
colluding cloud servers. But using SHE also limits the number
of both addition and multiplication operations one can execute
repeatedly over cipher-texts (an issue linked to the SHE depth -
see [19] for more details). [20] [21] were the first to introduce a
global image signature based SOCBIR. Rather than extracting
some local characteristics as SIFT and SURF features, these
schemes sums up an image to the distribution of its wavelet
coefficients in different sub-bands. Such a signature has been
shown more optimal in terms of retrieval performance when
the image texture plays a major role, which is often the case
in medical imaging.
Beyond the fact that these SOCBIR schemes require com-
munications in-between the user and one or two servers, they
compute image signatures in an un-encrypted form. Even if the
image content is not available, knowing its SIFT features may
give big clues about it. These features are indeed characteristic
points of the image. For instance, their positions can con-
tributes to the recognition of objects or person in an encrypted
image. We give in Fig. 1 an example of such a situation. There
is thus a need to extract image signatures that are themselves
encrypted. Such an issue was very recently addressed in
[21] and by next in [15] [16]. But, these solutions exploit
at least two cloud servers when computing signatures with
as consequence the increase of already high communication
requirements.
In this paper, we propose a novel global image signature
based SOCBIR. Working with the Paillier cryptosystem, it first
allows extracting from an encrypted image a signature in an
encrypted form, giving thus no clues about the image content.
It is based on two original secure signature calculation and
comparison algorithms that are fully conducted by the server
(or equivalently the cloud) that is to say without communica-
tions with a third party (i.e., the user or another server). Both
algorithms take advantage of a new way to rapidly compare
Paillier encrypted data with no communications, even if the
data are encrypted with different public keys. In order to make
possible the computation of a signature that corresponds to
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1: Illustrative examples issued from [11] of SIFT features
detection in the plain-text domain (a), (c), and in the Cipher-
text domain (b), (d).
the histograms of different wavelet sub-bands of the image,
we show the existence of a recursive relationship in-between
the random values of the Paillier cryptosystem at different
resolutions levels of the image wavelet transform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we come back on the definition of the homomorphic
encryption algorithm of Paillier and show how to use it so
as to rapidly compare encrypted data. Section III presents the
proposed Secure Outsourced CBIR scheme, detailing how to
extract an encrypted signature from an encrypted image with
no communication between the server or a third party (e.g., the
user or a second service provider). Its security and complexity
are discussed in Section IV. Performance of the proposed
solution are given and compared to the original solution in
the clear domain in Section V considering two application
frameworks: diagnosis aid support and user authentication
based on facial recognition. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PROCESSING OF HOMOMORPHICALLY
ENCRYPTED DATA WITH THE PAILLIER
CRYPTOSYSTEM
This section first presents the Paillier cryptosystem before
introducing how to rapidly compare data encrypted or not with
the same public key.
A. Paillier cryptosystem
We opted for the asymmetric Paillier cryptosystem because
of its additive homomorphic property [22]. In this work, we
use a fast version of it defined as follows. Let ((g,Kp),Ks)
be the public/private key pair, such as
Kp = pq and Ks = (p− 1)(q − 1) (1)
3where p and q are two large prime integers. ZKp =
{0, 1, ...,Kp − 1} and Z∗Kp denotes integers that have mul-
tiplicative inverses modulo Kp. We select g ∈ Z∗K2p such as
gKs − 1modK2p
Kp
∈ Z∗Kp (2)
The Paillier encryption of a plain-text m ∈ ZKp into the
cipher-text c ∈ Z∗K2p using the public key Kp is given by
c = E[m, r] = gmrKp mod K2p (3)
where r ∈ Z∗Kp is a random integer associated to m making
the Paillier cryptosystem probabilistic or semantically secure.
More clearly, depending on the value of r, the encryption
of the same plain-text message will yield to different cipher-
texts even though the public encryption key is the same. As
introduced in [23], it is possible to get a fast version of (3)
by fixing g = 1 +Kp without reducing the algorithm security.
By doing so, the encryption of m into c requires only one
modular exponentiation and two modular multiplications
c = E[m, r] = (1 +mKp)r
KpmodK2p (4)
As we will see in Section II-B, this property will be of
importance for the fast comparison of Paillier encrypted data.
Based on the assumption g = 1 + Kp, the decryption of c
using the private key Ks is such as
m =
(cKs − 1).K−1s mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp (5)
If we consider two plain-texts m1 and m2, the additive ho-
momorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem allows linear
operations on encrypted data like addition and multiplication,
ensuring that
E[m1, r1].E[m2, r2] = E[m1 +m2, r1.r2] (6)
E[m1, r1]
m2 = E[m1.m2, r
m2
1 ] (7)
B. Comparing Paillier encrypted data
Even though the additive property of the Paillier cryptosys-
tem allows linear operations, it can not conduct more complex
operations like data comparison or modulo reduction. These
operations are however essential in signal processing.
In our concern and as we will see in Section III, comparison
of encrypted data is a core operation in SOCBIR. Two distinct
classes of solutions can be considered. The first one, which is
also the main one studied since a long time, regroups methods
that are based on a protocol; a set of interactions between
two parties that do not collude. Many secure protocols are
known for comparing two integers, the so called millionaires’
problem. The first protocol was proposed by Yao [24] in 1982.
It corresponds to the well-known garbled circuit and has been
improved many times since. One of the most efficient im-
plementation based on homomorphic encryption is described
by T. Veuguen [25]. But, this one, as all the others, requires
many communications between parties so as to conduct one
comparison. The second kind of approach is communication
free and has been recently introduced by Hsu et al. in [11].
The solution we propose is an improvement of this approach.
It allows comparing two encrypted data, encrypted or not with
the same public key, in a less complex way. It takes into
account the fast implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem
of Section II-A.
• Comparing data encrypted with the same public key
Before presenting our solution, let us come back on the
proposal of Hsu et al. [11].
Let us consider a client-server relationship where the server
possesses two cipher-texts c1 = E[m1, r1] and c2 = E[m2, r2]
encrypted by the client; m1 and m2 are two integer values
the server wants to compare knowing only c1 and c2. The
basic idea of [11] is not to compare directly data but to
establish their relationship (smaller, greater or equal) through
the quantization of data from their encrypted versions. In
a first time, the client sends along with c1 and c2, a set
of thresholds {Ti}1≤i≤N that quantize the dynamic range
of both integer values m1 and m2. In practice, the client
chooses an increasing sequence of randomly distributed thresh-
olds {Ti ∈ ZKp}1≤i≤N and sends {E(Ti, r1)}1≤i≤N and
{E(Ti, r2)}1≤i≤N to the server. To compare data, the server
has first to identify the interval to which belongs each message
mu, u ∈ {1, 2}. Herein, it is considered that mu belongs to the
kthu interval, if the closest threshold of mu is Tku . To identify
ku, the server starts the following iterative process:
1) Comparison of E[mu, ru] with one threshold
E[Ti, ru]. Based on the Paillier cryptosystem property
E[mu, ru].E[a, b] = E[mu + a, ru.b] (see (6)), it is
possible to compute the distance D(Ti,mu, ) = Ti−mu
by iteratively multiplying E[mu, ru] with E[1, 1] until
the product equals E[Ti, ru]. The number of iterations
inc gives D(Ti,mu) (i.e. E[Ti, ru] = E[mu + inc, ru];
D(mu, Ti) = inc)
2) Closest threshold of mu. The closest threshold
Tku is naturally given by the minimum distance
in-between E[mu, ru] and all encrypted thresholds
{E[Ti, ru]}1≤i≤N . Based on the fact E[mu, ru]ginc =
E[mu + inc, ru], this whole process can be summed up
for any message mu, u ∈ {1, 2}, by
(du, ku) = arg min
i,inc
(E[Ti, ru]−E[mu, ru]ginc mod K2p)
(8)
where du is the distance between the message mu and
its closest threshold of index ku.
After having computed (d1, k1) and (d2, k2) for m1 and
m2, respectively, it is possible to determine whether m1 ≤
m2 or not without decrypting them. This is, due to the fact
that the same thresholds {Ti}1≤i≤N are used for m1 and m2.
Notice that knowing the relative distance between m1 and m2
gives no ideas about their respective values. At the same time,
the complexity of this approach depends of the number of
threshold.
Compared to [11] our proposal does not need an iterative
procedure as well as sending several thresholds. On the
contrary the user will just have to send to the server two
encrypted versions of one single threshold T , i.e., E[T, r1]
and E[T, r2]. T will be used as ”value of reference” into the
4Fig. 2: Basic interactions of an outsourced content based
image retrieval into the cloud.
dynamics of m1 and m2 for comparison. To directly compute
the distance du between mu and T based on E[mu, ru] and
E[T, ru], we take advantage of the fast Paillier cryptosystem
hypothesis, i.e, g = 1 +Kp, as follows
du = D(T,mu) = D
e(E[mu, ru], E[Tu, ru])
=
E[T,ru]E[mu,ru]
−1−1 mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp
=
gT rug
−mur−1u −1 mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp
=
gT−mu−1 mod K2p
Kp
mod Kp
= T −mu mod Kp
(9)
where D and De are two functions that allows computing the
L1-distance in the clear and encrypted domains, respectively.
As previously, once d1 and d2 are calculated, one can
determine if m1 ≤ m2 without any communications with the
user. Again, knowing the relative distance between m1 and m2
gives no clues about the values of m1 and m2. Compared to
the solution of Hsu et al. [11], the computation complexity of
which is O(KpN ) (for N thresholds, [11] needs
Kp
N iterations
to find the closest threshold in the worst case), our proposal
is O(1) (one threshold with no iteration).
• Comparing data encrypted with two different public
keys
It should be noticed that the above two solutions requires
that m1 and m2 are encrypted with the same public key Kp
and random value ru. To overcome this issue and to be able to
compare two messages m1 and m2 encrypted with different
public keys Kp1 and Kp2 and two random values r1 and
r2 that are respectively defined by two users U1 and U2,
for example (i.e., c1 = E[m1, r1] and c2 = E[m2, r2]), we
propose to exploit a reference value P in the following way.
It is asked to U1 and U2 to encrypt P with same parameters
as for m1 and m2, and to send the results, i.e., E[P, r1] and
E[P, r2], to the server. Based on (9), the server is able to
compute the relative distances d1 = D(P,m1) = P −m1 and
d2 = D(P,m2) = P −m2, from which it can derive m1−m2
or, equivalently, if m1 is equal or greater than m2. As we will
see in Section III-D, this last strategy will help us to compare
images encrypted by two different users.
Fig. 3: Image signature computation based on [4]. The
signature of the image corresponds to the set of its wavelet
sub-band histograms up to a given decomposition level. In
this example, only one decomposition level is considered.
HH , HG, GH and GG represent the approximation subband
and the horizontal, vertical and diagonal detail subbands,
respectively.
III. PROPOSED SECURED OUTSOURCED
CONTENT BASED IMAGE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM
In this section, we first provide a global view of a CBIR
system outsourced into the cloud before exposing how to
conduct each of its functionalities in a secure manner.
A. From classic CBIR to secure outsourced CBIR
The basic interactions of an outsourced content based image
retrieval system are exposed in Fig. 2 in the case of a diagnosis
aid support application. Two entities interact: the user (e.g. the
physician’s system) sends a query image to the cloud so as
to get an idea about the possible diagnosis. When the cloud
receives the request, it extracts or computes from the image a
signature it next compares to the ones of the images stored in
its database. It then returns to the user the most similar images
along with their diagnosis. In this scenario, all computations
are conducted in clear by the server. They correspond to the
image signature extraction and comparison which are the two
basic functionalities of a CBIR system.
In this work, we consider the global image signature based
CBIR algorithm proposed in [4] which sums up an image
into a signature that corresponds to the concatenation of the
histograms of the different wavelet sub-bands of the image
(see Fig. 3). The computation of this signature relies on two
steps:
• Calculation of the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) of
the image up the dth decomposition level.
• Computation of the histograms of the wavelet sub-bands
from the level 0 to the level d; and concatenation of the
histograms so as to obtain the image signature.
The solution we propose and detail in the sequel has been
developed under the following constraints: i) zero interaction
in-between the server or any other trusted third parties includ-
ing the user when computing and comparing image signatures;
and, ii) extract from an encrypted image an encrypted signa-
ture. As we will see, our proposal takes advantage of the ad-
ditive homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem and
of the communication free comparison solutions we derived
5in Section II-B. More clearly, our system allows retrieving
similar images with no needs of communications.
B. Wavelet Image Transform in the Paillier Encrypted Domain
The 2D wavelet transform of an image I in the clear domain,
considering the wavelet is separable, is defined as [26]
ad(x, y) =
∑
l∈Z
∑
l′∈Z
h(2x− y)h(2y − l′)ad−1(l, l′) (10)
bdu(x, y) =
∑
l∈Z
∑
l′∈Z
w(2x− y)w′(2y − l′)ad−1(l, l′) (11)
where ad(x, y) and bdu(x, y) are the approximation and de-
tail coefficients of the dth decomposition level, respectively;
(x, y) gives the position of the coefficient in the sub-band;
w,w′ ∈ {h, g} where h and g are the low-pass and high-pass
wavelet decomposition filters, respectively; u ∈ {hg, gh, gg}
is the index of the detail coefficient sub-bands (i.e., horizontal,
vertical and diagonal). In the case d = 0, a0(x, y) corresponds
to the image pixel I(x, y).
Due to the fact that the Paillier cryptosystem works with
plain-text and cipher-text constituted of positive integers in
ZKp (where Kp is the cryptosystem public key), all image
pixels and image processing algorithm’s parameters should
also be represented by integers. Even if we assume that all
pixels are integers, i.e, I(x, y) ∈ ZKp , their processing may
lead to negative values. In order to represent such values in
ZKp , integer values greater than
Kp−1
2 will correspond to
negative values and the others to positive values.
Similarly, in order to compute DWT in the encrypted
domain, the coefficients of the decomposition filters h and g,
which are real numbers, should be turned into integer values.
This can be achieved by scaling and quantizing the coefficients
of h and g as follow [27]
G = [Qg] ; H = [Qh] (12)
where [.] is the rounding function and Q is a scaling factor. Q
is a parameter defined by the user accordingly to the wavelet
transform he wants to exploit.
From this stand point, the encrypted versions of the wavelet
approximation and detail coefficients in the encrypted domain
are given as (using (6) and (7))
E[Ad(x, y), rd(x, y)] =
∏
l,l′∈Z
E[Ad−1(l, l′), rd−1(l, l′)]H(2x−y)H(2y−l
′)
(13)
E[Bdu(x, y), r
d
u(x, y)] =
∏
l,l′∈Z
E[Ad−1(l, l′), rd−1(l, l′)]W (2x−y)W
′(2y−l′)
(14)
where Ad(x, y) and Bdu(x, y) are the wavelet approximation
and detail coefficients of the dth decomposition level, respec-
tively; W,W ′ ∈ {H,G} where H and G are the expanded
version of the low-pass and high-pass wavelet decomposition
filters h and g, respectively; u ∈ {HG,GH,GG} indicates
the index of the detail coefficient sub-bands (i.e., horizontal,
vertical and diagonal). Notice that all multiplications and
exponentiation are carried out into Z∗k2p .
Fig. 4: Histogram HCdu of the coefficient sub-band C
d
u
in the clear domain, in the case of K = 5 classes with
a coefficient dynamic such as Cdu(x, y) ∈ [Cmin, Cmax].
{Tu}0≤u≤4 correspond to the class centers.
C. Calculation of the wavelet sub-band histograms in the
encrypted domain
As stated in Section III-A, once the image DWT computed,
the next step consists in building the histograms of its different
wavelet sub-bands. Let us first recall how to calculate a
histogram in the clear domain before explaining how to make
the same task in the Paillier encrypted domain so as to compute
a clear histogram and by next an encrypted histogram.
1) Histogram computation in the clear domain: Let us
consider Cdu(x, y) is a wavelet coefficient (either a detail or
approximation coefficient) at the position (x, y) in the sub-
band u, u ∈ {HH,GH,HG,GG}, at the decomposition
level d. In order to build the histogram HCdu of the sub-band
Cdu, the coefficient dynamic is first divided into K uniform
intervals or classes of width ∆ (see Fig. 4). By definition, the
value HCdu(k) indicates the number of coefficients C
d
u(x, y)
the values of which belong to the kth interval of HCdu . More
clearly, HCdu(k) gives the cardinality of the class Ck. If Tk
denotes the center of the kth interval of HCdu , then the class
Ck of Cdu(x, y) is given by:
k = arg min
p
|Cdu(x, y)− Tp| (15)
Another way to construct a histogram is to use a single
threshold instead of the K as explained before. The idea
behind this approach is that the server uses this threshold
as a reference point in order to find the membership classes
regardless of the quantification step. To do this, we will
consider T as a reference point, then the server computes
the distance dx,y between T and each wavelet coefficient
Cdu(x, y), this distance is given as:
dx,y = T − Cdu(x, y) (16)
After the computation of the distances, the objective now is
to construct the histogram from the distances between the
reference points and all the wavelet coefficients. To do this, we
suppose that dx,y and dx′,y′ present the distances of Cdu(x, y)
and Cdu(x
′, y′) with T respectively, then it is sufficient to
compare [di/∆] and [dj/∆], where ∆ is the quantization step
and [] is the floor operator. By doing so, if [dx,y/∆] and
[dx′,y′/∆] are equal then Cdu(x, y) and C
d
u(x
′, y′) belong to the
same class Ck otherwise no. After the comparison between the
6distances, the server can build an histogram with K uniform
classes, where K is given as K = |Cdu|/∆ and |Cdu| presents
the cardinal of the dynamic bounds Cdu.
2) Clear histogram computation in the encrypted domain:
The construction of the above histogram in the encrypted
domain imposes to determine the class Ck to which belongs
a wavelet coefficient Cdu(x, y) from its encrypted version
Cdeu (x, y) = E[C
d
u(x, y), r
d
u(x, y)] where r
d
u(x, y) is a random
integer number (see (3)). In other words, we need to compute
(16) in the encrypted domain.
To do so, the user has to send along with the encrypted
image the encrypted versions of the histogram class center,
i.e., E[T, rdu(x, y)]. Based on this information and using the
encrypted data comparison solution (9) of Section II-B, it is
possible to determine the interval or class of a the coefficient
Cdu(x, y) from C
de
u (x, y) as follow
dx,y = D
e(Cdeu (x, y), E[T, r
d
u(x, y)]) (17)
It is important to underline that in order the cloud server
computes (17) based on (9), the user needs to encrypt the
threshold T with the appropriate random value rdu(x, y) that
is to say the same random value associated to the encrypted
coefficient Cdeu (x, y). It is however possible to find a recursive
relation in-between the values rdu(x, y) from the level 0 to the
level d by using the Paillier cryptosystem properties (6) and
(7). Basically, rdu(x, y), u ∈ {HH,GHd, GHd, HGd}, is such
as
rdu(x, y) =
∏
l,l′∈Z
rd−1u (l, l
′)W (2x−l)W
′(2x−l′) (18)
As it can be seen rdu(x, y) is independent of the image content.
For d = 0, rdu(x, y) = r(x, y), i.e., the random integer value
used to encrypt the image pixel I(x, y).
Based on (17) and (18), the server can build the histogram
of one wavelet sub-band (HCdu ). In order to compare two
histograms, H
C
d(1)
u
and H
C
d(2)
u
of two images I(1) and I(2),
respectively, one just has for instance to apply the L1−distance
L1(H
C
d(1)
u
, H
C
d(2)
u
) =
∑
1≤k≤K
|H
C
d(1)
u
(k)−H
C
d(2)
u
(k)| (19)
Even though this solution makes use of encrypted histogram
class center E[T, r], it suffers of two security issues. The first
one stands on the fact the class cardinalities {HCdu(k)}1≤k≤K
are not encrypted. Along with the awareness the class centers
of the histogram are ordered, the histogram HCdu appears
thus in a clear form. Even if the coefficient dynamic bounds
are unknown, if one has some a priori knowledge about the
signal distribution, he or she will have big clues about the
content of the encrypted data. For instance, it is well known
that detail wavelet coefficients follow a Gaussian or Laplacian
distribution centered onto zero. We give in Fig. 5 a reconstruc-
tion attack example where the pirate replaced the encrypted
detail coefficients by approximated values depending on the
class they belong to. As it can be seen, even though the
approximation sub-band is unknown, it is possible to identify
that the encrypted image corresponds to the face of a person.
There is thus a need to secure the histogram itself. The second
weakness is in relation with the comparison algorithm depicted
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 5: Reconstruction attack example of the image (a)
from its encrypted wavelet detail coefficients considering two
decomposition levels and different quantization steps: (b)
∆ = 32, (c) ∆ = 64, (d) ∆ = 128
in Section II-B. If the pirate has an idea about the dynamic
bounds of Cdu, and if these bounds are part of the encrypted
class centers, then he will be able to determine the real value
of these centers. We discuss how to address these issues in the
next section.
D. Encrypted wavelet coefficient histogram
The above solution allows constructing a K class histogram
HCdu in a clear form from an encrypted wavelet sub-band
Cdu. The approach we propose now aims at building a secure
histogram HECdu the class cardinalities of which are in an
encrypted form (i.e. {E[HCud (k), rk]}1≤k≤K) and the class
centers of which cannot be ordered. It is based on two main
steps. The first one consists in building a noisy histogram HNCdu
from the encrypted image wavelet coefficients; histogram from
which the secure histogram HECdu will be computed, in a second
time.
The noisy histogram construction has as purpose to se-
cretly break the distribution of the wavelet coefficients onto
a larger dynamic, while giving access to an histogram the
class cardinalities of which are in a clear form (i.e., un-
encrypted). Our solution is equivalent to the addition of a
noise to the wavelet sub-band coefficients and to compute
the histogram of the resulting random variable as above. Let
us consider one wavelet coefficient Cdu(x, y) and N(x, y) a
uniformly distributed integer in the range [Nmin, Nmax] such
as Nmax > Cmax, where Cmax is the absolute maximum
value a wavelet coefficient can take in a subband. The ad-
dition of N(x, y) to Cdu(x, y) leads to a random variable
CdNu (x, y) = C
d
u(x, y) + N(x, y), the distribution of which
is quite closed to a uniformly distributed random variable. In
Fig. 6, we illustrate the result of such a procedure in the
case of a centered Gaussian random variable X of standard
deviation σ = 10 with a uniform random variable N in the
range [a, b] = [−50, 50]. The density probability fY of the
resulting random variable Y = X +N takes the form
fY (t) =
1
(b− a)
√
2piσ2
∫ b
a
exp(− (x− t)
2
2σ2
)dx (20)
From this stand point it is possible to compute the histogram
of the coefficients CdNu (x, y) in the encrypted domain as in the
previous subsection. To do so and assuming that the dynamic
7Fig. 6: Example of a noisy histogram - (a) Histogram of a
discrete Gaussian random variable X of mean ν = 0 and
standard deviation σ = 10; (b) Histogram of the random
variable Y = X + N , where N is a uniformly distributed
noise in the range [−50, 50].
Fig. 7: Mapping between classes of HNCdu and HCdu for a given
wavelet coefficient Cdu(x, y) and a noise N(x, y). The dynamic
of CdNu is much greater than the one C
d
u where (K
′ > K).
of CdNu is subdivided into K
′ intervals, the user sends along
with his encrypted image a set of K ′ encrypted class centers,
one set per wavelet coefficient (see Section III-C2). In our
approach and in order not modifying the encrypted image,
which could be used for other purposes than CBIR, it is asked
to the user to add N(x, y) to the histogram class centers
instead of the wavelet coefficient. Adding the noise to the
coefficients or to the class centers is equivalent. More clearly,
for one coefficient Cdu(x, y), the user sends the set of encrypted
class centers {E[Tk+N(x, y), rud (x, y)]}1≤k≤K′ . HNCdu will be
constructed by the server using these sets of encrypted class
centers. Notice, that because HNCdu is a uniform histogram, it
gives no clues to the server about the histogram of Cdu as
illustrated in the example given in Fig. 6. The next step is
how to derive the secure histogram HECdu , the number of class
of which is K, from this noisy histogram of K ′ classes.
The strategy we propose in order to derive HECdu from H
N
Cdu
is similar to Private information retrieval (PIR) [28]. It works
as follows. Let us consider the computation of the cardinality
of the kth class of the encrypted histogram HECdu(k). In a first
time and for one coefficient Cdu(x, y), the user generates a
vector PTkx,y of K
′ components; components that correspond
to the encryption of 0 with different random values (i.e.,
E[0, rz]) except its (k + N(x, y))th component which is
fixed to E[1, ru]. In fact, PTkx,y indicates for the corresponding
coefficient the correct position of the kth class accordingly
to the K ′ classes of HNCdu (Fig. 7 illustrates such a mapping
between the histogram classes of HNCdu and HCdu). On its side,
the server generates a vector Sx,y the K ′ components of which
are set to 0 except the lth one which indicates the class of HNCdu
to which belongs the coefficient Cdeu (x, y). Then, it computes
the inner product between Sx,y and PTkx,y
Sx,y.P
Tk
x,y =
{
E[1, ru] if C
d
u(x, y) ∈ Ck
E[0, rz] otherwise
(21)
we recall that Ck is the kth class of the histogram of Cdu. More
clearly, if Cdu(x, y) belongs to the k
th class of the histogram
then Sx,y.PTkx,y equals to E[1, ru]. On the contrary, it equals
E[0, rz]. By doing so, we remove the noise added to the class
centers without revealing if Cdu(x, y) belongs the k
th class of
HCdu . Finally, in order to compute H
E
Cdu
(k), i.e., the encrypted
cardinality of Ck, the server just has to multiply the results of
the inner products obtained for a sub-band taking advantage of
the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem (see
(7)) that is to say
HECdu(k) =
∏
Sx,y.P
Tk
x,y =
∏
E[qx,y, rv] = E[
∑
qx,y,
∏
rv]
(22)
where qx,y ∈ {0, 1}.
E. Comparison of two encrypted wavelet coefficient his-
tograms
As exposed in Section III-C2, the comparison of two
images I(1) and I(2) stored into the cloud in their encrypted
form by two users U1 and U2, respectively, stands on the
computation of the L1-distance between the image wavelet
sub-band histograms (see (19)).
Let us thus consider two encrypted histograms HE
C
d(1)
u
and HE
C
d(2)
u
, extracted from the encrypted version of I(1)
and I(2), respectively. At this stand point, it is important to
notice that HE
C
d(1)
u
and HE
C
d(2)
u
correspond to the cardinalities
H
C
d(1)
u
and H
C
d(2)
u
encrypted with different random values
and different public keys. It is however possible to compute
De(HE
C
d(1)
u
, HE
C
d(2)
u
) = D(H
C
d(1)
u
, H
C
d(2)
u
) using the second
strategy we proposed in Section II-B.
In order to measure the cardinality difference between two
classes, i.e., HE
C
d(1)
u
(k) and HE
C
d(2
u
(k), this solution requires
the comparison of these two quantities with a reference value
pk; value U1 and U2 a priori agreed on; that should be
encrypted with the same random value as in HE
C
d(1)
u
(k) =
E[H
C
d(1)
u
(k), r1k] and H
E
C
d(2)
u
(k) = E[H
C
d(2)
u
(k), r2k]. The
problem here is that r1k and r
2
k result from multiple operations
involved in the computation of HE
C
d(1)
u
(k) and HE
C
d(2)
u
(k),
respectively (see Section III-D). In order to make this step
possible without introducing interactions between the server
and the users, these ones have to send some further pieces
of information they ask the server to process along with the
computation of the secure histogram procedure so as to get
E[pk, r
1
k] and E[pk, r
2
k]. To do so, for one coefficient C
d
u(x, y),
both users generate a vector Px,y the K ′ component of which
correspond to the value pk encrypted with the same random
values as for PTkx,y (i.e., the vector that allows the mapping
in between the classes of the noisy histogram and the clear
8histogram - see Section II-B). During the computation of
HE
C
d(1)
u
(k), for instance, the server is asked for each coefficient
to compute along with (21) the inner product
Sx,y.Px,y =
{
E[pk, ru] if C
d
u(x, y) ∈ Ck
E[pk, rz] otherwise
(23)
Then and as for computing HECdu(k), it has to multiply the
inner products’ results in order to get
E[
∑
pk, r
1
k] =
∏
Sx,y.Px,y =
∏
E[pk, ru] = E[
∑
pk,
∏
ru]
(24)
Due to the fact the same random values have been used
either for computing HE
C
d(1)
u
(k) and E[
∑
pk, r
1
k], we have
r1k =
∏
ru. Following the same procedure with the image
of the second user, the server will get access to E[
∑
pk, r
2
k].
Assuming the images are of same dimensions, the L1-distance
in-between two classes is
De(HE
C
d(1)
u
(k), HE
C
d(2)
u
(k)) = D(H
C
d(1)
u
(k),
∑
pk)−
D(H
C
d(2)
u
(k),
∑
pk)
= H
C
d(1)
u
(k)−H
C
d(2)
u
(k)
(25)
and the L1 distance between the two encrypted histograms
De(HE
C
d(1)
u
, HE
C
d(2)
u
) =
∑
De(HE
C
d(1)
u
(k), HE
C
d(2)
u
(k)) (26)
F. Summary of the procedure
To sum-up, our Secured Outsourced Content Based Image
Retrieval requires that one user sends with his encrypted image
the following different pieces of information:
• In order the server computes the noisy histograms HNCdu
for each DWT sub-bands, the user needs to provide for
each coefficient, K ′ Paillier encrypted class-centers.
• In order the server calculates the encrypted cardinality of
the kth class of the encrypted histogram HECdu(k), and to
compare it with the one of another image, the user has
to upload for each coefficient
– One vector PTkx,y of K ′ components that maps the kth
class of the histogram in the clear domain with the
classes of the noisy histogram; PTkx,y will be exploited
by the server so as to calculate HECdu(k)
– one vector Px,y that contains a reference value the
different users agreed on and which is encrypted
K ′ times with the same random values as for PTkx,y ,
vector the server will use in order to compute the
L1 distance in between encrypted histograms of
different images.
Once all data have been received, the server can compute in a
differed time the different encrypted histograms with no-needs
to interact with a trusted third party or the user.
To conclude, in the case of a dyadic separable wavelet
transform and images of even dimensions n.m, as well as
a wavelet transform up to d decomposition levels while
considering that a sub-band histogram in the clear domain (i.e.,
HCdu ) is constituted of K classes and that the noisy histogram
stands on K ′ classes, the number of Paillier encrypted integer
values that the user has to sends along with the image is
m.n.K ′ + 2.K ′.K[3
d∑
i=1
m
2i
n
2i
+
m
2d
n
2d
] = m.n.K ′.(2K + 1)
(27)
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Scheme security
The security of our SCOBIR approach relies on
the construction of secure wavelet sub-band histograms,
the cardinalities of which are encrypted (i.e., HECdu ={E[HCdu(k),rk ]}1≤k≤K), from a noisy histogram. Such a noisy
histogram HNCdu is achieved by adding a uniformly distributed
noise to the histogram class centers; noise the dynamic of
which is much larger than the one of wavelet coefficients(see
Section III-D). Even if HNCdu is built by the server, i.e., this
one knows to which class of HNCdu belongs one encrypted
coefficient, it has no means to identify the real class of Cdu.
Indeed, it does not know the class center values of HNCdu , which
are encrypted, and has no idea of the mapping in between the
K ′ histogram classes of HNCdu with the K ones of the clear
histogram (i.e., HCdu ). The probability the server guess the
correct class of a coefficient Cdu(x, y) is
1
2K . In fact, adding
the noise to the class centers just shifts the K classes of
HCdu over the K
′ ones of HNCdu . Knowing the class of C
de
u
in HNCdu only informs the server that HCdu has been shifted
around this position for this coefficient, but this one is not
able to exactly identify the class of Cdu(x, y). We give in Fig.
8 the result of the reconstruction attack depicted in Section
III-C2, where a pirate replaces encrypted coefficients that are
in the same histogram class by the same arbitrary value. As
shown, the image remains unintelligible. Even if the server has
some a priori knowledge about the distribution of the wavelet
coefficient sub-bands, it cannot deduce any information from
the noisy histogram.
Regarding the secure wavelet sub-band histogram HECdu , due
to the fact the cardinalities of its classes are Paillier encrypted,
the server has no clues about the class center ordering. Notice
also that, based on the way HECdu is derived from H
N
Cdu
(see
Section III-D), the server is not able to identify the HECdu class
of an encrypted coefficient Cdeu (x, y).
B. Complexity and memory needs
As stated in Section III-F, in the case of a dyadic wavelet
transform and an image of even dimensions n.m, the user
has to encrypt n.m + n.m.K ′.(2K + 1) integer values (the
image and the ancillary data) and send them to the server.
These data will be stored in the server database. The associated
computation complexity is bounded by O(m.n.K ′.(2K+1)).
This complexity is important but data are sent once. Notice
also that all these pieces of information can be used for
other purposes than SOCBIR or for computing SOCBIR with
different wavelet transforms, for example.
On the server side, the computation complexity stands on
the wavelet transform of the images in the encrypted domain,
9(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 8: Reconstruction attack example of the image (a) from
its encrypted wavelet coefficients considering two decompo-
sition levels and different quantization steps: (b) ∆ = 32, (c)
∆ = 64, (d) ∆ = 128.
the construction of the different histograms and on the L1-
distance computation between signatures. The computation
complexity of the two latter corresponds in fact to the number
of comparisons the server has to do which is bounded by
O(m.n.log2(K
′)) along with the number of modular multi-
plications between the results of the histogram inner-products
that is bounded by O(m.n.K). The server need also to
perform O(m.n.K) multiplications to compute the cardinality
of one class of the encrypted histogram. To compute the
L1-distance in-between signatures, O(LK) substractions are
required, where L is the size of database. Regarding the
computation of the wavelet transform, this one imposes to con-
duct m.n.log2(K ′) + 2.m.n.K multiplications and additions.
As a consequence the computation complexity at the server
side is bounded by O(m.n.log2(K ′) + 2.m.n.K) modular
multiplications.
Compared to the scheme presented in [21] which allows
extracting a secure global signature from a Paillier encrypted
image but with the help of two cloud providers, the complexity
of which in terms of computation is of O(m.n) encryption
for the user and O(m.n.K + L.K + L) encryptions for both
servers, our approach is of K ′(2K+1) times greater in terms
of computation complexity for the user and log2(K ′) + K
times greater for the server. However our proposal uses only
one server and is free of communication rounds while [21]
require 3 communication rounds (i.e., data transmission, sig-
nature computation and signature comparison).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Test databases and performance criteria
Our SOCBIR scheme has been experimented considering
two application frameworks: diagnosis aid support and au-
thentication based on face recognition (see Section I). In both
cases, data are stored encrypted in the cloud. For a new image
(a medical image to interpret or a user to recognize), the user
system encrypts it and sends it to the server along with all
pieces of information depicted in Section III-F. The server
will send back the most similar images it will have identified
in its database.
We give in Fig. 9 some image samples issued from our
two test image databases. The medical database regroups 1200
8 bit depth retina images of 2240 × 1488 pixels associated
with pieces of information about the lesions present into each
(a) (b)
Fig. 9: Illustrative samples of our image test sets (a) retina
image, (b) facial images of one user.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 10: Encrypted version (b) of the retina image (a). (c)
noisy histogram of the vertical detail sub-band at the first
image decomposition level (i.e., of the coefficients Cd=1HG )
with a uniform random noise in the range [−128, 128], a
quantization step ∆ = 1, considering K ′ = 512 classes. (d)
Encrypted histogram of the same sub-band with K = 256
classes.
images. The face recognition database is issued from the
Olivetti Research Laboratory of Cambridge, UK. It contains
400 images of 92 × 122 pixels that correspond to 10 pho-
tographs of 40 distinct subjects.
In both use-cases, the performance of our SOCBIR scheme
is evaluated in terms of CBIR mean precision which corre-
sponds to the rate of returned images with the same pathology
or with the same person as in the query image. As we will see,
this measure will vary upon the number of classes considered
into the histograms.
B. SOCBIR scheme performance with medical images
In this experiment, the 2D Haar wavelet transform (HWT)
has been considered. In order to make its computation possible
in the encrypted domain up to the 2nd resolution level (i.e.
d = 0, 1, 2), its decomposition filters’ coefficients have been
turned into integer values by fixing the quantization factor
Q of (12) to 4 (see Section III-B). The signature of one
image corresponds to the sub-band histograms up to a given
resolution level, including the histogram of the approximation
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Fig. 11: Retrieval performance expressed in mean precision
at five (in %) for our medical database considering different
quantization step values (∆) and distinct decomposition level
(d). Dashed curves denote SOCBIR results in the encrypted
domain (ED) while full curves give the performance of the
equivalent CBIR system in the clear domain (CD).
sub-band. The random variable added to the class center values
is in the range [−128, 128].
Before detailling the retrieval performance of our scheme,
let us first come back on the amount of data the user has to
send. In the case images are Paillier encrypted with large prime
numbers p and q such that their product, i.e., the public key Kp
(see (1)), stands on 1024 bits, then one encrypted integer will
be 2048 bit encoded. A direct consequence of such memory
needs is that it is difficult to conduct large experimentations
with such public key size on a single computer. In order to
reduce these needs, all the following tests have been conducted
with a public key of 16 bits. The retrieval performance of
our scheme with a key of 1024 bits can be directly derived
from these results as they are independent of the public key
size. Results will be the same. We give in Fig. 10, a view
of an encrypted retina image accompanied of the noisy and
encrypted histograms of its vertical detail sub-band of its
first wavelet decomposition level. It can be seen that these
histograms are uniformly distributed as expected.
Fig. 11 provides the retrieval performance of our scheme
for a mean precision at five, that is to say that, for one request
image, the server returns the five most similar images it finds in
its database. We also compare our scheme with the same CBIR
approach in the clear domain considering different wavelet
decomposition levels (i.e., d = {0, 1, 2}) and several histogram
quantization step values (i.e., ∆ ∈ [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64]).
Notice also that all curves are plotted in average, using 200
images of our retina image test set as user request images;
the 800 other images constitute the server database. As it can
be seen our SOCBIR scheme has the same performance than
the CBIR scheme in the clear domain. Such a result can be
explained based on the fact the filter coefficients of the Haar
wavelet transform in the encrypted and the clear domains
are equivalent. More clearly, the coefficient expansion (12)
does not impact the wavelet transform precision. This may
not be the case with wavelet transforms the filter coefficients
of which are real numbers. Indeed, a loss of precision in the
wavelet coefficient computation could reduce the performance
retrieval. Beyond, if in the clear domain one may work with
∆ = 1, i.e., working with the most accurate histogram based
signature, using values of ∆ at least 16 times greater do not
impact so much retrieval performance. Let us also recall that
the smallest ∆, the more precise is the histogram and the
greater is the number of encrypted histogram class centers the
user has to send along with his image.
C. SCOBIR performance for face recognition
This experiment has been conducted with the same
parametrization as the previous one. Again, our test image
database has been split into two sets: 200 facial images are
used as request image set while the 200 others are used
as reference images by the server. The mean precision at
five of our scheme and the equivalent approach in the clear
domain is given in Fig. 12, in average, depending on different
quantization step values (i.e., ∆ ∈ [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64]) and
decomposition levels (i.e., d = {0, 1, 2}). The response of our
scheme to one request image is also illustrated in Fig. 13.
Again, one can see that our SOCBIR approach achieves the
same performance as the CBIR approach in the clear domain
whatever the quantization step and the level of decomposition.
Based on the fact facial images are much smaller than retina
images, the amount of information the user has to send to the
server is reduced. This is the same for the time computation
when comparing images.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel Secure Outsourced
CBIR method, which allows completely carrying out a search
in an encrypted image database maintained by a server.
Contrarily to actual homomorphic encryption based CBIR
schemes, it allows the extraction of an encrypted global image
signature and does not require extra communications between
the user and the server or a trusted third party during the
search computation. It exploits a secured histogram procedure
we proposed so as to build encrypted wavelet coefficient
histograms from an encrypted image taking advantage of a fast
comparison of Paillier encrypted data and a noisy histogram.
Experimental results show that our SOCBIR scheme achieves
the same performance as the equivalent CBIR approach in the
clear domain. If our solution guarantees data confidentiality
and good retrieval performance with zero communication, its
use in real practice remains limited due to the fact it requires
the user to send Gigabits of encrypted data when using a public
key of 1024 bits so as to be secure. Future works will focus
on reducing this amount of information.
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Fig. 12: Retrieval performance expressed in mean precision
at five (in %) for our face database considering different
quantization step values (∆) and distinct decomposition level
(d). Dashed curves denote SOCBIR results in the encrypted
domain (ED) while full curves give the performance of the
equivalent CBIR system in the clear domain (CD).
Fig. 13: Illustrative example of the response of our SOCBIR
scheme to a request for user authentication.
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